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Abstract Some analysts use sequential dominance criteria, and others use equivalence
scales in combination with non-sequential dominance tests, to make welfare comparisons of
joint distributions of income and needs. In this paper we present a new sequential procedure
which copes with situations in which sequential dominance fails. We also demonstrate that the
recommendations deriving from the sequential approach are valid for distributions of
equivalent income whatever equivalence sc l  the analyst might adopt. Thus the paper marries
together the sequential and equivalizing approaches, seen as alternatives in much previous
literature. All results are specified in forms which allow for demographic differences in the
populations being compared. 
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1. Introduction
The dominance criteria of Atkinson (1970) and Shorrocks (1983) have become well-
known, and are now widely used for making welfare comparisons on the basis of income
distribution data. These approaches, though, do not take into account the sort of non-income
information - such as family size, age, type of housing - which is these days available in plenty
in micro data sets, and may be of welfare relevance. Hence the old results have begun to be
viewed as of limited usefulness. One could not, for example, use the generalized Lorenz
dominance approach to recommend as welfare-improving the transfer of income from single
persons to families with children, or to those with special needs such as old age or infirmity.
In response to this perceived shortcoming, Atkinson and Bourguignon (1987) developed
their sequential generalized Lorenz dominance criterion, for the c mparison of joint distributions
of income and needs, the latter assumed to be an ordinal variable, and this criterion has been
found broad enough for some operational purposes. There is now a flourishing literature on the
sequential approach. One thinks for example of Atkinson's (1990) illustrative account, Jenkins
and Lambert's (1993) extension to allow for demographic change, Chambaz and Maurin's (1998)
comprehensive survey and introduction of additional sequential procedures, and the exploration
of the welfare fundamentals by Ok and Lambert (1999). 
Meanwhile, other analysts have been using equivalence scales, to deflate incomes and
supposedly render distributions socially homogeneous, and going on to apply the old results.
This begs interpretation of the income measure in the Atkinson and Shorrocks theorems, and
2sole argument i  the assumed welfare functions, as equivalent income. However, Ebert (1997)
has warned against a too naive approach; if attention is not also paid to the appropriate
weighting of income units, the implicittransfer principle is a non-implementable one (of units of
living standard), rather than the implementable one involving money transfers from those with
higher living standards to those with lower ones. In Ebert (1997, 1999) it is shown how to adapt
the generalized Lorenz dominance methodology to this situation using artificial populations of
fictional 'equivalent adults', and in Ebert and Moyes (2000) this procedure is pinned down as the
only method, in a wide class of possible equivalizing transformations and weighting schemes,
which is consistent with normative requirements. Yet there remain conceptual and practical
problems in constructing equivalence scales (see e.g. Banks and Johnson, 1994).
Fleurbaey et al. (2000) articulate a transfer principle that should hold for betwen-group
transfers for all equivalence scales in a bounded range, and present the appropriate dominance
criterion for welfare functions respecting this principle. The riterion is not sequential. Fleurbaey
et al. (2000, p. 4) describe it as "a middleway criterion" between Ebert's generalized Lorenz
criterion and Atkinson and Bourguignon's sequential generalized Lorenz criterion. 
In this paper, we draw together all of the sequential welfar  comparison procedures which
have been enunciated in the literature, and present a new one which copes with situations in
which sequential dominance fails. We then go on to explain how these same sequential
procedures can be used by those who advocate the use of equivalence scales, to avoid the actual
business of choosing a particular equivalence scale, or even  rang  of values for the equivalence
scale deflators. The paper thus makes a contribution to the eff rt to better understand and marry
together these two distinct approaches to making welfare comparisons in the presence of social
heterogeneity. 
The structure of the paper is as follows. In section 2, we lay out som basic definitions and
preliminaries, in terms of which the analysis proceeds. In section 3, simple manipulations are
used, involving combinatorics and integration, to obtain the analytical relationships which drive
all the subsequent results. In Section 4, we show how the needs dimension can be entered into
the social utility-of-income function through certain sets of restrictions, one of which is new. In
section 5, the conditions are obtained under which welfare is unambiguously higher for one joint
distribution of income and needs than another. Sequential generalized Lorenz dominance
emerges as one appropriate criterion. A stronger condition, sequential rank dominance, also
emerges, as does a new and much weaker criterion appropriate for cases where generalized
Lorenz curves cross somewhere in the sequence. Section 6 contains an example to show that the
3new criterion is effective: it provides an intuitively agreeable welfare ranking in a simple case
where the other criteria both fail. In section 7, the results are respecified to allow for
demographic differences. In section 8, we show how the sequential procedures generat
recommendations which are valid for distributions of equivalent income, whatever the
equivalence scale. Section 9 concludes. 
2. Definitions and Preliminaries
We suppose that there are n household types, differentiate  and ranked by needs, type i=1
being judged the neediest in a specific welfare sense to be discussed in section 4. Household
money income distributions F and G will be compared, with overall distribution functions F(x)
and G(x) where x 0 R . The type-specific distribution functions associated with F and G will be+
F (x) and G(x), and the density functions will be f(x) and g(x), 1#i#n. The proportion ofi i i i
households belonging to each type i will be assumed the same in F and G for most of the paper,
and written p. In extending the results to allow for demographic diffe ences, we will later rewritei
these proportions p and p. iF iG
Social welfare functions (henceforth SWFs) will be assumed additively separable over
money incomes, with different utility functions U(x), assumed differentiable, being applied toi
the different types:
(1) W   =  E pI U(x)f(x)dx,  W  =  E pI U(x)g(x)dx F 1#i#n i 0 i i G 1#i#n i 0 i i
z z 
Here z denotes the highest income present in either F or G; z could be an arbitrary income level
exceeding this maximum, with no effect on measured welfares. The needs structure will be
expressed by conditions relating the utility functions U(x) and U(x) of adjacent types, 1#j#n-1.j j+1
In Ok and Lambert (1999) the assumption of additivity of the SWF across types is relaxed, but
we do not pursue that line here. The bundle of utility functions which specify the welfare
function, <U, ,.... U>, will be called a utility profile. 1 2 n
3. Signing Welfare Differences
The starting point for the analysis is the formula:
(2) W -W  = E pI U(x)[f(x)-g(x)]dxF G 1#i#n i 0 i i i
z 
quantifying the welfare superiority of F over G, which derives from (1). By rewriting this
expression in a number of different ways, a range of sequential tests can be identified, in terms
of the type-specific distribution functions F(x) a d G(x), 1#i#n, which, if successful, will ensurei i
that W-W  is signed unambiguously positive for appropriate classes of SWFs W (equivalently,F G
      We refer here to the partial summation formula of Abel, according to which, given real numbers v and w, 1#i#n,2 i i
E vw = E dt, where d= v-v  for 1#j#n-1, d = v, and t= E w for 1#j#n. 1#i#n i i 1#j#n j j j j j+1 n n j 1#i#j i
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for appropriate classes of utility profiles <U,U ,.... >, for these define the SWFs). 1 2 n
We begin by integrating by parts in (2), and reversing the order of summation and
integration:
(3) W -W  =  E pI U'(x)[G(x)-F(x)]dx = I {E U'(x)[pS'(x)]}dxF G 1#i#n i 0 i i i 0 1#i#n i i iz z 
where S(x) is defined by:i
(4) S(x) = I [G(y)-F(y)]dy. i 0 i i
x 
Next we apply a combinatoric argument to the integrand in the right hand side of (3), and again2
reverse the order of summation and integration:
(5) W -W  = E {I D(x)T'(x)dx}F G 1#j#n 0 j jz 
where D(x) and T(x) are defined, for 1#j#n, by:j j
(6) D(x) = U'(x)-U '(x) for 1#j#n-1, D(x) = U'(x)j j j+1 n n
and:
(7) T (x) = E pS(x)j 1#i#j i i
respectively. Integrating by parts again, (5) becomes:
(8) W -W  = E {D(z)T(z) - I D'(x)T(x)dx}F G 1#j#n j j 0 j jz 
and integrating by parts yet again, it can equivalently be written:
(9) W -W  = E {D(z)T(z) - D'(z)I T (x)dx + I D"(y){I T (x)dx}dy}F G 1#j#n j j j 0 j 0 j 0 jz z y 
Expressions (5), (8) and (9) will furnish the conditions for welfare superiority of F over
G which form the core of the paper. Distributional conditions will be expressed in terms of the
functions T (x); normative assumptions about inequality aversion and the needs structure willj
come through restrictions on the marginal utility differences D(x).j
4. The Needs Structure
Systematic differences between the utility functions U(x) and U(x) of adjacentj j+1
household types (1#j#n-1) embody the social judgements about needs. Consider this
hypothetical question. A new unit of resource is made available (call it $1); among households
at a given income level x, to a household of which of the two types j and j+1 would it be socially
more advantageous to give the $1? From (6), D(x) = U'(x)-U '(x) is the additional social meritj j j+1
in awarding the $1 to a household of type j with an income of x, over a household of the next-
less-needy type j+1 at the same income level.
5If D(x) > 0 j#n-1, x then awards are always more efficient in welfare terms when givenj
to a needier, rather than an adjacent less needy, household at each income level. If we impose
also the condition D(x) > 0 x then, because D(x) = U'(x), all utility functions necessarily haven n n
positive first derivatives, a condition we might well have imposed ab initio. Let U  =1
{<U,U ,.... U> : D(x) > 0 j, x}, and let W  be the class of SWFs based on utility profiles1 2 n j 1
in U . 1
If in addition D'(x) < 0 j#n-1, x, then the extra social value in granting a new unit ofj
resource to a needier household at each income level declines with increas  in that income level:
among rich households, it hardly matters who would get it. This assumption about how needs
and income should be related was introduced by Atkinson and Bourguignon (1987). Since D'(x)n
= U "(x), adding the condition D'(x) < 0 x ensures concavity of all utility functions, i.e.n n
inequality aversion within types. This is also assumed by Atkinson and Bourguignon. Let U  =2
{<U,U ,.... U > 0 U  : D'(x) < 0 j, x}, and let W  be the class of SWFs based on utility1 2 n j1 2
profiles in U . 2
If also D"(x) > 0 j#n-1, x, then as between two types j and j+1, it is judged even betterj
to give the extra $1 to a household of type j at a low r income level, rather than at a higher one.
If we add the condition D"(x) > 0 x then, because D"(x) = U"'(x), all utility functions nown n n
have positive third derivatives, i.e. satisfy Kolm's (1976) Principle of Diminishing Transfers for
within-group redistributions: small transfers across a fixed income gap are judged better at lower
income levels than higher ones. This is consonant with the between-group judgements. Under
these assumptions, for each group the social marginal valuation of income decreases at a
decreasing rate, as does the difference in social marginal valuation of income between any needy
and less needy group. Let U  = {<U,U ,.... U> 0 U  : D"(x) > 0 j, x}, and let W  be the3 2 31 2 n j
class of SWFs based on utility profiles in U . The welfare class W has not, to our knowledge,3 3
been proferred as normatively interesting before. 
5. Distributional Conditions
The central new result of the paper now drops out very simply, along with the existing
sequential dominance tests of Atkinson and Bourguignon (1987) which have already been
alluded to. Just inspect formulae (5), (8) and (9), for the welfare difference W-W , and pieceF G
together the sign properties assumed of the functions D(x) for the three welfare classes W , Wj 1 2
6and W  respectively with corresponding appropriate sign properties for the functions T(x), to3 j
obtain sufficient conditions under which all terms in the right hand sides of (5), (8) and (9) are
positive:
Theorem 1
(1) [Atkinson and Bourguignon, 1987, Proposition 2] W $ W    0 W  ] T'(x) $ 0 j,F G j1
x 0 [0,z];
(2) [Atkinson and Bourguignon, 1987, Proposition 3] W  $ W  W 0 W  ] T(x) $ 0 j,F G j2
x 0 [0,z];
(3) W  $ W  W 0 W  ] T(z) $ 0 and I T (x)dx $ 0 j, y 0 [0,z].F G j 0 j3 y 
The first two of these sequential distributional tests are due to Atkinson and Bourguignon
(1987), who also show necessity. For necessity in condition (3), see the appendix. The sequential
conditions can, in each case, can be checked in descending order by j, first, when j=1, for the
neediest type; second, when j=2, for the two neediest types taken together; and so on, up to the
final stage j=n, when all types are merged. We consider each test in turn in a moment.
Consider first what theorem 1 says if the population would be socially homogeneous, with
no perceived differences in household needs. Then the case j=1 is the only one, and T(x) can1
be set equal to I [G(y)-F(y)]dy. The tests in parts (1), (2) and (3) of theorem 1, on the0
x 
derivative, level and integral of this function, correspond to those for first, second and third
order stochastic dominance in the uncertainty literature (Whitmore, 1970, Bru elle and Vickson,
1975). In the income distribution context, the criterion in (1) is known as rank dominance
(Saposnik, 1981), and that in (2) as generalized Lorenz dominance (Shorrocks 1983). The
former is more demanding than the latter, but has been found almost as successful for
international comparisons by Bishop et al. (1991). The criterion in (3), which corresponds to
Shorrocks and Foster's (1987) transfer sensitivity in the socially homogeneous case (see also the
little-known Atkinson, 1973 and Davies and Hoy, 1994 n this), does not translate into a simple
dominance criterion, but is satisfied, in particular, when the generalized Lorenz curves for F and
G cross once, with F's initially dominant, provided F has the same mean as G and no higher a
variance (Dardanoni and Lambert, 1987, Shorrocks and Foster, 1987). In Lambert (1993),
sufficient conditions are given for (3) to hold when generalized Lorenz curves cross more than
once; see also Davies and Hoy (1995).
The same tests can be applied sequentially in the heterogeneous case, in the merged
subpopulations comprising the j most needy subgroups, 1#j#n. This is clear because, if F(x) andj
G(x) are the distribution functions for income in the j merg d subpopulation, so that [Ej th 1#i#j
7p].F(x) = E pF(x) and [E p].G(x) = E pG(x), the conditions for first, second andi 1#i#j i i 1#i#j i 1#i#j i i
j j
third degree dominance of F over G are in terms of the function I [G(y)-F(y)]dy which, from0
x j j
(4) and (7), equals T(x)/E p. Hence T'(x) $ 0 x corresponds to rank dominance in thisj 1#i#j i j
merged subpopulation; T(x) $ 0 x corresponds to generalized Lorenz dominance; and thej
mean-variance condition is sufficient for T(z) $ 0 and I T (x)dx $ 0 y if the generalizedj 0 j
y 
Lorenz curves cross once with F's (i.e. the one induced by F) initially dominant: j
Corollary
(1) [Atkinson and Bourguignon, 1987] W $  W 0 W  ] for each set of the j mostF G 1
needy subgroups, 1#j#n, F rank dominates G;j j
(2) [Atkinson and Bourguignon, 1987] W $  W 0 W  ] for each set of the j mostF G 2
needy subgroups, 1#j#n, F generalized Lorenz dominates G;j j
(3) If sequential generalized Lorenz dominance as in (2) isnot satisfied, but at each stage j for
which it fails, (a) the two generalized Lorenz curves cross once with F's init allyj
dominant, (b) the means are the same, and (c) F has no higher a variance than G, then Wj F
$ W  W 0 W .G 3
 The criterion of (1)is known as sequential rank dominance and theat of (2) as sequential
generalized Lorenz dominance. Both were id ntified by Atkinson and Bourguignon (1987) as
equivalent to the tests of parts (1) of theorem 1 (see also Atkinson, 1990 on this). The sequential
test in (3) has not been articulated before. It could be extended to cover cases of multiple
generalized Lorenz intersections. All of these ests involve familiar constructions: distribution
functions (for rank dominance), generalized Lorenz curves, means and variances. The tests of
theorem 1 are in terms of the less familiar unctions T(x), 1#j#n, but these tests are just as easyj
to implement as those of the corollary using household survey microdata.  
Bourguignon (1989) identifies a dominance criterion that accords with a welfare class we
might call W , in which the type-specific utility functions have the needs structure D(x) > 01½ j
j, x of our W  and are also concave, as in our W . No restrictions are placed on the D'(x),1 2 j
1#j#n-1, for W  however. It is easy to see that in W , all rich-to-poor transfers from less1½ 1½
needy to needier household are approved; this is therefore the case in W  and W  also. Ebert2 3
(2000) characterizes W and W  axiomatically bmeans of transfer principles. Bourguignon's1½ 2
criterion for W  is "not easy to evaluate", involving, effectively, "all ordered vectors of1½
[possible] poverty limits" (ibid, page 74). His test will succeed in some cases in which sequential
rank dominance fails, but never when sequential generalized Lorenz dominance fails.
Bourguignon suggests a numerical algorithm for the test.
86. An Example
A simple example shows the potential usefulness of the criterion in part (3)of theorem 1.
The example we select is one for which the sufficient condition of part (3) of he corollary fails.
As shown in table 1, suppose that in the (initial) scenario G, three couples have money incomes
of 4, 6 and 8, and three single persons each have 6. 
Table 1
    couples      singles   
G 4 6   8 6 6 6
F 6 8 10 5 5 5  
The change from G to F is brought about by taking $1 from each single and giving it, with
another $1 from the outside, to each couple. Most analysts would, we believe, favour the $1
money transfer from each single to each couple. The granting of a further $1 of resource to each
couple is a Pareto improvement in this worse-off group, and would be favoured over the wider
population by all welfar unctions satisfying the strong Pareto principle. Hence the move from
G to F could be seen as a welfare improvement. However, the generalized Lorenz curves for F
and G cross, so that sequential rank and generalized Lorenz dominance both fail at the second
(final) stage - though of course recording an improvement at the first stage. Bourguignon's test
thus also fails. In fact, the gen ralized Lorenz curves for F and G cross twi e, see figure 1a: the
criterion of the corollary, part (3) therefore fails too. But the sequential test of theorem 1, part
(3), does not fail: the two T-functions of that test, T(x) and T(x), satisfy the conditions stated.1 2
In fact T(x) $ 0 x and, although T(x) goes negative in the range 5½ < x < 7, T(z)$ 0 and1 2 2
I T (x)dx $ 0 y : see figure 1b. Hence W $  W 0 W . ? 2 F Gy 3
[FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
This example verifies that the test of part (3) of theorem 1 is applicable in normatively
interesting cases, and that the corresponding test of the corollary may fail in some such cases.
It also establishe  a firm interest in the welfare class W , in which the Principle of Diminishing3
Transfers and its between-groups c nterpart both feature, each advocating that the benefits of
distributional changes be directed towards family units at lower rather than higher income levels.
W  is an appropriate class for welfare analysis, and the T-functions of theorem 1 are an3
appropriate distributional tool.
      Alternatively one can posit the existence of an income level z* such that U( ) = U(z) = ... = U(z) for all z $3 1 2 n
z* and all admissible utility profiles (see Jenkins and Lambert, 1993, but also Moyes, 1999). 
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7. Demographic Differences
Theorem 1 can be extended to cope with demographic differences between th
distributions being compared with an additional normative assumption. Letting p and p be theiF iG
proportions of households of type i in distributions F and G respectively, the extension involves
simply replacing the function T(x) of (7) (see also (4)) by a new one:j
(10) T *(x) = E I [p G(y)-pF(y)]dy, j 1#i#j 0 iG i iF i
x 
provided one accepts that the U(z) all converge to the same value as z 6 4.  This assumptioni
3
means that the social decision-maker does not care about the family types of the super-rich.
Taken along with the other properties assumed of the utility profiles in our welfare classes, this
additonal assumption implies U(x) # U (x) # .. # U (x) x. Denote by W *, W * and W *1 2 n 1 2 3
the subclasses of W , W  and W  in which the additional property holds for all utility profiles.1 2 3
Theorem 1*
(1) [Jenkins and Lambert, 1993, Chambaz and Maurin, 1998] W $ W  W 0 W * ] T*'(x)F G j1
$ 0 j, x 0 [0,z];
(2) [Chambaz and Maurin, 1998] W $ W  W 0 W * ] T*(x) $ 0 j, x 0 [0,z];F G j2
(3) W  $ W  W 0 W * ] T*(z) $ 0 and I T *(x)dx $ 0 j, y 0 [0,z].F G j 0 j3 y 
The full, necessary and sufficient results in parts (1) and (2)of theorem 1* are due to
Chambaz and Maurin (1998). Sufficiency in all three cases, (1), (2) and (3) is readily seen by
tracking through the mathematics of section 3 again, and is demonstrated explicitly in Jenkins
and Lambert (1993) for part (2). See the appendix for the proof of necessity in case (3). The
modified criteria are not, however, expressible in terms of rank and generalized Lorenz
dominance: the corollary to theorem 1 does not extend. 
8. Equivalization 
An alternative approach to the sequential on  for making social welfare comparisons in
heterogeneous populations is to select an equivalence scale, deflate household incomes
accordingly, and apply the tests that are appropriate for socially homogeneous populations to
the pooled equivalent incomes of all households. However, not all analysts agree with the
normative use of equivalence scales (Fisher 1987, Coulter et al. 1992), and even among those
who do, there is plenty of "room for disagreement" about what the appropriate equivalence scale
should be (Atkinson 1992, p. 43). Authors such as Buhmann et al. (1988) and Cutler and Katz
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(1992) have suggested parameterization as a way to take account of a range of judgements about
the needs of families of different sizes. As we shall see, the sequential tests in our theorem 1 and
corollary allow the analyst who believes in equivalence scales to side-step the issue of choosing
one, and make w lfare comparisons that are robust to changes in equivalence scale relativities.
An equivalence scale is a set of income deflators m, 1#i#n, ordered to express the needsi
structure: 
(11) m > m > ... > m1 2 n
We will consider the class of SWFs defined over equivalent incomes which is advocated by Ebert
(1997, 1999), and indeed is obligatory if the normative approach of Ebert and Moyes (2000) is
endorsed. This involves a fictitious population of "equivalent adults", m such beings occupyingi
each houshold of type i. If there are no demographic differences between F and G, the Ebert
SWFs can be written:
(12) E   = 3 pmI U(x/m)f(x)dx,   E  = 3 pmI U(x/m)g(x)dxF i i 0 i i G i i 0 i i
z z 
where U(") is increasing and concave in equivalent income ". (We attend to demographic
differences shortly).
Let E  be the class of Ebert SWFs as in (12). Now define two subclasses, E  = {E 0 E1 2 1
: U"(") + "U"'(") > 0 "} and E  = {E 0 E  : 2U"'(") + "U""(") < 0 "}, for reasons which3 2
will become apparent. Both of these include the subclass E  for which the utility-of-equivalent-A
income function takes the Atkinson (1970) form U(") =" /(1-e) where 0 < e  1 measures1-e
inequality aversion. The class E , extended to include the inequality-neutral utility function forA
which e=0, has been characterized axiomatically by Ebert (1995). 
We may identify the contribition mU(x/m) in the Ebert SWF with the contribution U(x)i i i
to aggregate welfare according to (1), so that <mU(x/m), mU(x/m), .. mU(x/m)> becomes1 1 2 2 n n
a utility profile for the preceding welfare analysis. Then a little manipulation shows that:
(13) E  d E  d W  ,    k = 1,2,3. A k k
as shown in the appendix (and in fact E  f W ). The message in (13) is clear. Distributional1 1½
analysts in favour of equivalizing may try sequential methods using money income distributions
before beginning the restrictive business of choosing an equivalence scale and resorting to
mythical populations:
      Fleurbaey et al. (2000), in their conclusions, suggest "to start again all the analysis of this paper in order to have4
the dominance criterion obtained degenerating to Atkinson and Bourguignon's one" when the bounds on equivalence
scales are removed (rather than to Bourguignon's, as now). The Atkinson and Bourguignon criterion is the one in part
(2) of theorem 2. Thus a way forward might be to combine bounded equivalence scales with the restriction U"(") +
"U"'(") > 0 " defining the class E . The third derivative condition U"'(") > 0 ", which is implied by this restriction,2
is interesting in its own right but its implications have yet to be explored.
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Theorem 2
(1) Under the conditions of either theorem 1, part (1) or the corollary, part (1), E  $ E  forF G
all equivalence scales and all E 0 E e E  1 A
(2) Under the conditions of either theorem 1, part (2), or the corollary, part (2), E  $ E  forF G
all equivalence scales and all E 0 E e E  2 A
(3) Under the conditions of either theorem 1, part (3) or the corollary, part (3), E  $ E  forF G
all equivalence scales and all E 0 E e E  3 A
Bourguignon's algorithm (which is non-sequential) is in fact necessary and sufficient for
dominance for the class E  (ibid, p. 76). Fleurbaey t al.'s (2000) criterion, which is not1
sequential either, is necessary and sufficient for E -dominance for the case when equivalence1
scale relativities are bounded; the algorithm they specify for the case n = 2 reduces to
Bourguignon's in case the equivalence scale bounds are removed. It is an open question to find
conditions on money income distributions which are equivalent to E -, E - or E -dominance2 3 A
for all equivalence scales. The question is not easy, since with every change of equivalence scale
there is a change in the (artificial) population across which welfare in alternative distributions of
income are being compared. The Bourguignon/Fleurbaey et al. approach may offer some scope
here. If one's normative interest is captured by the Atkinson-type SWFs of th subclass E , then4 A
any of our sequential tests, the weakest being the one permitting single generalized Lorenz
intersections, will suffice to ensure dominance whatever the equivalence scale. 
Theorem 2 can be extended to cases in which the demographics differ in F and G. Th s
involves a restriction to subclasses E * of the E  (k = 1,2,3) in which the utility of equivalentk k
income function is such that mU(z/m) becomes invariant to changes i  m as z 6 4. For this, U(")
and "U'(") must approach the samelimit as " 6 4, a significant restriction. The sequential tests
of theorem 1* then yield unambiguous recommendations for the subclasses E *, E * and E *1 2 3
and all equivalence scales, but these subclasses do not contain E .  Fleurbaey et al. (2000)A
consider this scenario and adapt their algorithm accordingly. 
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9. Conclusions
The dominance criteria of Atkinson (1970) and Shorrocks (1983), for making welfare
comparisons between populations on the basis of income distribution data, have been adapted
in existing literature to take non-income information into account. One adaptation is to use
sequential procedures (Atkinson and Bourguignon, 1987); another is to use an equivalence scale,
create artificial populations of 'equivalent adults' and continue as before (Ebert, 1997). In this
paper, we have presented a new sequential procedure which copes with situations in which
sequential dominance fails. We have also shown how to modify it to allow for demographic
differences. Finally, we have explained how the sequential procedures can be used to generate
recommendations which are valid for distributions of equivalent income, whatever the
equivalence scale. The paper thus serves both to survey and extend the sequential literature, and
to marry it with the literature on equivalization, which has until recently been seen as entirely
distinct. 
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Appendix
Proof of necessity in theorem 1, part (3).
Fix a number 8 > 1 and let a(x) be any real-valued function which is positive over [0, 8z].
Let b(x) = I a(t)dt, c(x) = I b(t)dt, and d(x) = I c(t)dt. Then b(x) < 0, c(x) > 0 and d(x)8z 8z 8z
x x x 
< 0 over [0,z]. Also b'(x) = a(x), c'(x) = b(x) and d'(x) = c(x) x. 
Now let " , " , ... "  be given positive real numbers and define U(x) = 3 " .d(x), so1 2 n i i#k#n k 
that U'(x) = 3 " .c(x), U"(x) = 3 " .b(x) and U"'(x) = 3 " .a(x). Thus U'(x) > 0,i i#k#n k i i#k#n k i i#k#n k i
U"(x) < 0 and U"'(x) > 0 x 0 [0,z]. i i
Observe that D(x) = " c(x) > 0, D'(x) = " b(x) < 0 and D"(x) = " a(x) > 0 for all x 0j j j j j j 
[0,z]. Thus the utility profile <U,U ,.... U> belongs to U . This is so for each number 8 > 1,1 2 n 3
each choice of function a(x) > 0 on [0,8z] and all choices of positive real numbers " , " , ..." .1 2 n
Hence, substituting in (9), we kno that a necessary condition for welfare dominance of F over
G for the class W  is that3
(A) W -W  = E " {c(z)T(z) - b(z)I T (x)dx + I a(y){I T (x)dx}dy} $ 0F G 1#j#n j j 0 j 0 0 jz z y 
for each 8 > 1, each function a(x) > 0 on [0,8z] and all positive reals " , " , ... " . 1 2 n
Now as 8 6 1, b(z) 6 0 and c(z) 6 0. Letting 8 6 1 in (A), we must have
(B) E " I a(y){I T (x)dx}dy $ 01#j#n j 0 0 j
z y 
for all positive reals " , " , ... "  and all functions a(x) > 0 on [0,z]. In turn this means that for1 2 n
each j,
(C) I a(y){I T (x)dx}dy $ 00 0 j
z y 
for all functions a(x) > 0 on [0,z] (otherwise, for a contradiction, let "  6 0 in (B) for i  j). Thisi
in turn means that 
(D) I T (x)dx $ 0.0 j
y 
for each y 0 [0,z]; otherwise, if I T (x)dx < 0 on some interval [u,v] f [0,z], we could choose0 j
y 
a sequence of positive-valued functions a(x) which approach zero outside [u,v] as k 6 4, stayingk
strictly positive somewhere within [u,v], and then (C) would be contradicted.
To show that T(z) $ 0 j is also necessary for welfare dominance of F over G for the classj
W , redefine a(x), b(x), c(x) and d(x) as follows. Let N be a positive integer, a(x) = 1/N, b(x)3
= (x-8z)/N, c(x) = 1 + {(x-8z)/2N} and d(x) = {(x-8z) /6N} + (x-8z). As before, b(x) < 0, c(x)2 3
> 0 and d(x) < 0 over [0,z] and b'(x) = a(x), c'(x) = b(x) and d'(x) = c(x) x. Defining the utility
profile <U,U ,.... U> exactly as before, (A) still holds. This time let N 6 4 in (A). Since a(x)1 2 n
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6 0, b(x) 6 0 and c(x) 6 1 for all x as N 6 4, we may conclude that
(E)  E " T (z) $ 01#j#n j j
for all positive reals " , " , ... " . This in turn forces 1 2 n
(F) T (z) $ 0j
for each j, using a similar argument to the preceding one.
Necessity in theorem 1*, part (3).
In the presence of distributional change, T(x) is replaced in (9) by T*(x) and an additionalj j
restriction is required on utility profiles. Redefining U(x) = 3 " .[d(x) - d(z)] in the above,i i#k#n k 
this restriction is met, since U(z) = 0 i, but nothing else is materially affected; the same proofsi
go through for the functions T*(x) and the welfare class W * as for the functions for T(x) andj j3
the welfare class W .3
Proof that E  d W , k = 1,2,3, as in (13).k k 
Setting U(x) = mU(x/m), the marginal utility difference D(x) = U'(x/m)-U'(x/m ) isi i i j j j+1
positive for all equivalence scales satisfying (11) since U is concave; also U is conc ve for thei
same reason; hence E  d W  d W . We have D'(x) < 0 x for all equivalence scales if and1 1½ 1 j
only if U"(x/m)/m decreases with m given x, and D"(x) > 0 x for all equivalence scales if andj
only if U"'(x/m)/m increases with m given x. The derivatives of hese two functions with respect2
to m are -[U"() + "U"'(")]/m and -[2U"'() + "U""(")]/m respectively, where "= x/m. It2 3
follows that E  d W  and E  d W .2 2 3 3 
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Figure 1 : The example
a: the function T(x)2
b: the function I  T (x)dx0 2y
